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While democracy has proven to be a fragile and elusive form of politics in the modern Arab world, 
Islamist movements have flourished--ranging from grass-roots pro-democracy activism to militant 
jihadism and terrorism. Whether Arab politics witnesses more political liberalization in the near 
future will depend in large part on the nature of Islamist movements, as well as ruling regimes’ 
reactions to them. This article examines the broad range of Islamist alternatives within one of the 
more liberalizing Arab states--the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan--with a view to understanding the 
depth and breadth of Islamist forms of political mobilization. 
The Islamist movement in Jordan has a 
history and heritage as old as that of the 
Hashemite regime itself. While Jordan’s main 
Islamist political party--the Islamic Action 
Front (Jabha al-Amal al-Islami or IAF)--was 
not legalized until the early 1990s, Jordan’s 
Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) 
maintained a functional relationship with the 
Hashemite monarchy especially throughout 
the reign of King Hussein (1953-1999), who 
tolerated the Ikhwan as a loyal opposition. 
Indeed the relationship between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy 
predates even the reign of King Hussein. Most 
strikingly, Islamist activism in Jordanian 
politics has for more than 60 years emphasized 
reform, moderation, and democratic 
participation, rather than revolution, 
radicalism, and militancy. Yet in November of 
2005, militant Islamists affiliated with al-
Qa’ida in Iraq carried out a series of deadly 
bombings in the capital, Amman. Within 
hours, Jordan’s own Islamist movement had 
organized anti-al-Qa’ida demonstrations, 
condemning al-Qa’ida and militant Islamist 
terrorism. In doing so, Jordan’s Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamists demonstrated 
the sharp--but too often underemphasized--
difference between reformist and 
revolutionary approaches to Islamist activism. 
This article examines the rise of the 
Islamist movement in Jordan, with emphasis 
on the longstanding relationship between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite 
monarchy. It then moves on to study the move 
toward political liberalization in the latter 
years of King Hussein’s reign and the 
corresponding shift within the Islamist 
movement toward legalized political party 
activism and electoral participation. Yet while 
Jordan’s Islamist movement has, therefore, 
been overwhelmingly reformist rather than 
revolutionary, and democratically-minded 
rather than militant, there nonetheless remain 
alternative Islamist forces that focus on jihadi 
ideas. The article therefore also examines the 
rise of the Salafiyya movement in the kingdom 
as well as the impact of foreign (including al-
Qa’ida) jihadists in militant confrontations 
with the Jordanian state and society. Finally, 
the article discusses the implications of the 
Hashemite regime’s increasing emphasis on 
state security at the expense of political 
liberalization, and potentially at the expense of 
moderate forms of Islamism. 
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN 
HASHEMITE JORDAN 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 
1928 in Egypt by the Islamist activist Hasan 
al-Banna. The organization quickly developed 
branches throughout the Arab world, calling 
for a reassertion of Islam into public life in 
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both government and society. While the 
Muslim Brotherhood established a presence in 
almost every Arab country, the individual 
organizations remained mainly autonomous, 
responding to local and national 
circumstances. In the case of Jordan, the 
Muslim Brotherhood was established 
officially in the kingdom in 1945. From the 
very beginning, the Brotherhood made clear 
that its agenda was Islamist but not militant, 
and this drew the recognition of the state itself. 
In 1946, King Abdallah I officially recognized 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a charitable 
society in Jordan, and the king actually 
presided over the ceremony himself. Abdallah 
even included Muslim Brotherhood Secretary 
Abd al-Hakim al-Din in his governing cabinet, 
making this early linkage between the 
Brotherhood and the Hashemites 
institutionally clear.1
From the outset, the Muslim Brotherhood 
established a pattern of loyal opposition to the 
Hashemite regime. By emphasizing reform 
rather than revolution, the Brotherhood saw 
itself in partnership with the Jordanian state. 
As the regime consolidated its rule within 
Jordan, its moderate political positions, pro-
Western foreign policy, and conservative 
monarchical institutions immediately served 
as a target for emerging Cold War ideological 
rifts, as well as emerging regional nationalist 
and revolutionary tensions. Thus from the 
perspective of the ruling regime, this de facto, 
if not de jure, relationship between the 
monarchy and its Islamist loyal opposition 
was intended in part to provide a counter to 
left-leaning secular oppositional trends 
ranging from Ba’thism to Nasserism to 
Communism. 
While the regime attempted to curb leftist, 
secular, and pan-Arabist political tendencies, 
the monarchy simultaneously permitted its 
Islamist opposition to flourish. This allowed 
the Muslim Brotherhood to become by far the 
best organized group in the Jordanian 
opposition.2 In doing so, the moderation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood also acted as a counter to 
more radical trends within Islamism, such as 
the Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) that had 
espoused a more revolutionary brand of 
Islamism, particularly in the 1960s and 
1970s.3 In an effort to enhance its own Islamic 
credentials, the Hashemite regime 
continuously emphasized the direct lineage of 
the royal family from that of Muhammad. The 
Brotherhood too has at times emphasized this 
level of Islamic legitimacy, in contrast to the 
many secular, leftist, or nationalist regimes 
that emerged in the Arab world in neighboring 
Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. 
Beyond more direct political or 
governmental activism, however, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has taken very seriously its role 
as a charitable organization. With regime 
approval, the Brotherhood established the 
Islamic Center Charity Society in 1963, and 
was able to tap into funding generated from 
the oil economies of the wealthy and socially 
conservative Arab Gulf monarchies. For 
several decades now, the Brotherhood has 
presided over a range of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Indeed, the only 
organization that patronizes and sponsors 
more social and charitable organizations is the 
Hashemite royal family itself. The 
Brotherhood, meanwhile, established across 
the country an array of schools and health 
clinics, including the Islamic Hospital in 
central Amman.4 
While it is clear that relations between the 
Hashemites and the Brotherhood are almost as 
old as the Jordanian state itself, this does not 
mean that the two sides have always agreed. 
The Muslim Brotherhood did indeed support 
the monarchy through its wars with Israel, its 
foiling of various nationalist coup attempts, 
and even the Jordanian civil war between the 
Hashemite army and the guerrilla forces of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 
1970-1971. The Brotherhood walked a slightly 
finer line during the various political 
upheavals triggered by International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) economic austerity programs, 
such as the “bread riots” of 1989 and 1996.5 
Yet at other times the Brotherhood has 
directly opposed Hashemite policies, even 
while maintaining its de facto status as loyal 
opposition. The Brotherhood adamantly 
opposed Anwar Sadat’s separate peace treaty 
with Israel, for example, and viewed the 
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Hashemite regime as too mild in its own 
opposition to Sadat’s move. When King 
Hussein resolutely stood by the shah of Iran in 
1979 even as the Iranian Islamic Revolution 
swept the monarchy away, the Brotherhood 
again objected to the official Jordanian stance. 
This rift actually deepened following the 1980 
Iraqi invasion of Iran, as Jordan supported 
Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist Iraq in its war with 
the Iranian revolutionary regime. For Hussein, 
the prospect of an Islamist movement 
successfully toppling a conservative pro-
Western monarch was positively chilling. Yet 
for the brotherhood, opposing the only 
successful Islamist regime in the region was 
unconscionable. 
In more contemporary politics, the major 
policy rift between the Islamist movement and 
the Hashemite state has centered on Jordan’s 
own peace treaty with Israel signed in 1994. 
The Islamist movement adamantly opposed 
the treaty at the time, and in the years 
afterward its opposition only grew. The 
Brotherhood became a leading part of the 
broader “anti-normalization” movement in 
Jordan; if the opposition could not prevent the 
treaty, it could and did manage largely to 
prevent normalization of society-to-society 
relations. Since Islamists had tended to win 
democratic elections for the leadership 
positions within most of Jordan’s professional 
associations (for doctors, engineers, lawyers, 
and pharmacists, for example), the Islamist 
movement was institutionally positioned to 
maintain its self-declared ban on working with 
Israeli counterparts.6 
 
THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT, 
LIBERALIZATION, AND ELECTIONS 
 
Jordan’s program of political liberalization 
began in earnest in 1989, as a direct response 
to widespread political unrest in the kingdom. 
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
economic austerity program, imposed in an 
attempt to improve the kingdom’s declining 
economy, had triggered rioting throughout the 
country. The depth and breadth of the political 
upheaval had clearly shaken the regime itself, 
which responded with what amounted to 
“defensive democratization.”7 King Hussein 
fired the unpopular Prime Minister Zayd al-
Rifa’i, shuffled the governing cabinet, and 
announced the return of elections for 
parliament for the first time since martial law 
had been declared in the wake of the 1967 
War with Israel. Jordan’s political 
liberalization thereafter included several 
rounds of democratic parliamentary elections 
(1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, and 2007), the lifting 
of martial law (1991), legalization of political 
parties (1992), and several rounds of revisions 
regarding government control of media, press, 
and publications.8 Given its longstanding 
relationship with the regime, and its status as 
virtually the only officially tolerated form of 
opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
perfectly positioned to benefit from the new 
atmosphere of openness. As parliamentary and 
electoral life returned to the kingdom, the 
Brotherhood was able to capitalize on 
decades-worth of organization. 
Yet beyond the Brotherhood, Jordan also 
has a long tradition of independent Islamist 
activism in addition to that of organized 
groups such as the Ikhwan, or their 
contemporary political party: the IAF. 
Independent Islamists have tended to resist 
joining organizations like the Muslim 
Brotherhood, or parties like the IAF, which 
they often accuse of being co-opted by the 
regime. Among the most well-known 
independent Islamist activists is the outspoken 
Layth Shubaylat, who was among those 
independents serving in the 1989-1993 
parliament. Shubaylat has argued that 
“institutional” Islamism is effectively a tool of 
the regime, which thereby has managed to 
“tame” the Muslim Brotherhood.9 
Shubaylat’s strident criticism of the regime 
and its policies led to his arrest in 1992. In 
what amounts to a familiar pattern of curbing 
dissent in the Hashemite kingdom, Shubaylat 
was arrested, tried, convicted, and soon 
thereafter pardoned by the king. While this is 
nowhere near the level of ruthlessness one 
finds in other regional regimes, the message 
and latent threat to the opposition more 
generally is nonetheless clear. Having a 
criminal conviction also bars an individual 
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from running for office in the future, and the 
regime therefore managed to remove 
Shubaylat from parliamentary opposition 
permanently. 
Unlike Shubaylat and other critics, the 
Muslim Brotherhood intended not only to 
compete in the elections, but also hoped 
ultimately to gain positions in government and 
reform state policy. In the 1989 elections, to 
the surprise of many in the Hashemite regime, 
the Muslim Brotherhood secured 22 
parliamentary seats (out of a total of 80), while 
independent Islamists won an additional 12 
seats. With a bloc of 34 seats in parliament, 
the Jordanian Islamist movement elected one 
of its most influential leaders, Dr. Abd al-Latif 
Arabiyyat, to be speaker of the house. For 
Arabiyyat, the events of 1989 served as a 
“wake-up call” for the Hashemite regime.10 
Prime Minister Mudar Badran, responding to 
the Islamist electoral victories, invited several 
Islamists into his government. This, however, 
led to a rift within the movement regarding a 
very important proposition: Should Islamists 
serve in the government at all? 
Hardline members of the Islamist 
movement argued that this amounted to a kind 
of capitulation to the state, and in effect a 
contamination of the movement itself. Many 
left the Brotherhood over this issue, becoming 
part of Jordan’s longstanding traditional of 
independent Islamist thought and activism. 
Yet the more mainstream members of the 
Ikhwan saw serving as cabinet ministers as a 
well-deserved reward for years of 
organizational effort. Among this latter group 
were Abdallah Akaylah (minister of 
education), Yusuf al-Azm (minister of social 
development), Majid al-Khalifa (minister of 
justice), Zayd al-Kilani (minister of awqaf and 
religious affairs), and Adnan al-Jaljuli 
(minister of health).11 
With five cabinet portfolios and leading a 
bloc of 34 parliamentary seats, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had accomplished an astounding 
political victory. This was tempered rather 
quickly, however, when public opinion turned 
against many of the measures that the Islamist 
ministers imposed. The most notorious of 
these included a failed attempt to ban alcohol 
in the kingdom, sexual segregation in some 
governmental office buildings, and a ban (later 
rescinded) on fathers watching their daughters 
in competitive sports. It is important to note, 
here, that this too played into the state’s 
strategy. While the Hashemite regime had no 
way of knowing what specific policies would 
be implemented, regime officials were certain 
that the Islamist ministers--if given room to 
maneuver----would in fact rile public opinion 
against their various measures. The idea, in 
short, was to ease tensions by including the 
opposition in government, but also to allow 
them to fall flat in the face of a backlash in 
public opinion.12 
In any event, the government itself was 
dissolved merely six months later, and 
replaced with an equally short-lived cabinet 
led by new Prime Minister Tahir al-Masri, a 
more liberal and progressive politician. This 
time, the Brotherhood rejected the few token 
ministries it was offered and instead worked to 
oust the Masri government in a no confidence 
vote. While the vote never carried, Masri’s 
position had become quickly unworkable, and 
once again the government was replaced.13 
The regime clearly remained alarmed at the 
level of Islamist influence and electoral 
success, however, and government efforts 
thereafter turned on limiting Islamist successes 
in future elections. The regime therefore 
responded to the Islamist victories with a 
sweeping change of the electoral system: 
changing to a one-person one-vote structure 
with modified electoral districts. While the 
earlier system, which allowed Jordanians to 
vote for multiple MP’s (depending on how 
many would represent the given district) had 
perhaps exaggerated Islamist strength, the new 
system was designed to do precisely the 
reverse. In the 1993 elections, which followed 
the legalization of political parties in the 
kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
directly participate, returning instead to its 
traditional role as political, social, and 
charitable movement. Instead, many Ikhwan 
members, and even Islamists outside the 
Brotherhood, formed and joined the IAF.14 
The IAF over time became, in effect, the 
political party wing of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood. As such, the IAF participated in 
the 1993 elections, but secured only 16 
parliamentary seats, while independent 
Islamists dropped to a mere six seats. 
However, this drop off in representation 
appeared to be due more to the changed 
electoral law, rather than to a backlash against 
Islamist government policies.15 
Following the drop in electoral strength in 
the 1993 elections, the Islamist movement 
demanded a repeal of the newer electoral 
system. They correctly argued that the districts 
themselves were unbalanced: over-
representing more conservative, pro-regime 
rural areas, and under-representing more 
urban--and more Palestinian--areas that had 
provided key bases of support for Jordanian 
Islamism. When the government refused to 
comply with Islamist demands to change the 
electoral system, the IAF led a broad-based 
opposition coalition (including leftist and pan-
Arab nationalist parties) in an 11-party boycott 
of the 1997 elections. The resulting parliament 
naturally proved to be overwhelmingly 
conservative, nationalist, and pro-
Hashemite.16 With only six independent 
Islamist MP’s in the new parliament, and no 
MP’s whatsoever from the IAF, Islamist 
strength and strategy shifted from parties and 
parliament, toward the professional 
associations instead. In short order, Islamist 
candidates won the leadership posts of almost 
every professional association in the kingdom 
(e.g. engineers, pharmacists, medical doctors), 
thereby creating a basis for Islamist political 
activism outside the halls of parliament, but 
very much with 17in Jordanian civil society.  
 
KING ABDALLAH II AND THE 
ISLAMIST MOVEMENT 
 
In 1999, King Hussein of Jordan died after 
a long battle with cancer. He was succeeded 
by his eldest son, Abdallah, who became King 
Abdallah II. While the succession itself had 
proceeded smoothly and peacefully, the same 
could not be said for regional politics and 
hence Jordan’s immediate political 
environment. With the emergence of the 
second Palestinian uprising--or intifada--in 
2000 and preparations looming for a second 
U.S. war on Iraq, the new Jordanian regime 
decided to put off part of the political 
liberalization process, by postponing 
parliamentary elections scheduled for 
November 2001. 
Yet in 2003, after two years of 
postponements, Jordan held its fourth round of 
parliamentary elections since the start of the 
liberalization process in 1989. The 2003 
elections were the first under King Abdallah 
II, and marked the return of the opposition to 
electoral politics. This time the IAF and the 
opposition parties eschewed the boycott tactics 
of 1997 and instead contested the elections, 
which were held under a new set of laws 
extending the number of parliamentary seats 
from 80 to 110, including a minimum of six 
seats to guarantee women’s representation in 
parliament. Seventeen IAF members gained 
parliamentary seats. Interestingly, the IAF 
parliamentary deputies included Hayat al-
Musani, the first woman elected to parliament 
under the quota system. In addition to the IAF 
bloc, five independent Islamists were also 
elected to parliament.18 
While the IAF remained focused on its own 
Islamist political agenda, most legislation 
continued to emerge from the government 
itself, with the parliament serving as a 
debating forum that usually provided a 
legislative stamp of approval for government 
initiatives. The IAF had no success in 
achieving its broadest policy goals. These 
unfulfilled goals included implementing 
Shari’a (Islamic law) and abrogating the 
Jordan-Israel peace treaty. 
Still, the IAF did align itself with more 
secular conservative forces to block repeated 
government attempts to change Jordan’s laws 
regarding “honor crimes;” that is, crimes 
purportedly linked to family honor in which 
men kill female relatives who are believed to 
have in some way shamed the family. Jordan’s 
monarchy itself has endorsed attempts to 
change the kingdom’s otherwise lenient 
pattern of sentencing for these crimes. Yet the 
Islamist movement, in temporary alliances 
with other social conservatives in parliament, 
has consistently opposed attempts to change 
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the legal system regarding “crimes of 
honor.”19 
 
Salafists, Jihadists, and “Jordan’s 9-11” 
 
While the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
IAF are the best organized, most recognizable 
faces of Islamism in Jordan, there also remain 
more subtle and even underground forms. 
Jordan’s Salafiyya movement, for example, 
has grown steadily since the 1980s. The term 
“Salafi” refers to the earliest Muslim 
communities and specifically the immediate 
companions of Muhammad. The Salafiyya 
movement, in fact, originally emerged from 
the reformist efforts of Islamic Modernist 
thinker Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the 
nineteenth century. Yet in the late twentieth 
century the term Salafiyya has changed 
dramatically and perhaps even reversed the 
earlier emphasis on modernism and reform. 
Salafism today, in contrast, usually refers to a 
more hardline and puritanical approach to 
Islamic revivalism. Some versions of Salafism 
(although not all) have turned instead toward 
militancy, terrorism, and jihadi activism. 
In the Jordanian case, as in many other 
countries, the rise in Salafi activity coincided 
with the end of the Afghani mujahidin war 
against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This 
is, in short, a much more recent phenomenon 
than the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Many credit the rise of a Salafi alternative (to 
both the Jordanian state and its more 
established Islamist opposition) to the arrival 
in Jordan of the influential Salafi Shaykh 
Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Bani. Shaykh al-
Bani fled to the kingdom from Syria in 1979, 
as the Ba’thist state was deepening its 
crackdown on Sunni Islamists in Syria. In the 
words of Quintan Wiktorowicz, the arrival of 
al-Bani “precipitated an explosion of Salafi 
activism” as he essentially served as a “focal 
point” for Islamists seeking a return to what 
they viewed as a more authentic and 
traditional approach to Islam.20 
Still, while the Salafi alternative has 
increased in strength in Jordan over time, it 
also remains of at least two minds. Some 
Salafists believe that radical change is needed 
in Jordan, but they do not necessarily believe 
that jihad is either viable or appropriate. For 
others, jihad is the only alternative. Not 
surprisingly these latter Salafists include many 
returned veterans of the Afghan wars. The 
jihadi tendency within the Jordanian Salafi 
movement sees itself as takfiri; that is, those 
who declare the Hashemite state as kafir--
unbelievers against whom jihad is no less than 
a duty. These Salafi jihadists are influenced 
not only by Shaykh al-Bani, but also by the 
earlier writings of thirteenth century Islamist 
Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and twentieth 
century Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb.21 
Wiktorowicz has argued that while the 
Muslim Brotherhood and IAF rely on formal 
organization and participation in political 
parties, professional associations, and 
charities, the Salafi movement has instead 
relied on informal networks for recruitment 
and activism. He further argues that many of 
Jordan’s religious scholars, the ulama, are 
themselves Salafists. The informal networks, 
meanwhile, allow Salafists to at least attempt 
to continue their activism under the radar of 
state surveillance.22 Still, despite the rise in 
Salafiyya ideas and activity, most of Jordan’s 
Islamist movement remains more mainstream, 
reformist, and democratic, while the major 
terrorist threats have come largely from 
foreign al-Qa’ida militants. 
The worst terrorist attack in Jordan 
occurred in November 2005, as noted at the 
outset of this article, as al-Qa’ida suicide 
bombers struck three luxury hotels in central 
Amman, killing 60 people--mostly Jordanians-
-and injuring more than 100. The IAF and the 
Muslim Brotherhood were among the first to 
respond to the tragedy by organizing anti-al-
Qa’ida demonstrations in the capital. The 
demonstrations underscored the difference 
between moderate mainstream pro-democratic 
forms of Islamism (such as Jordan’s Muslim 
Brotherhood) and militant global jihadi 
organizations (such as al-Qa’ida). The 
terrorists struck on the 9 November 2005--
hence, it was literally “Jordan’s 9-11”--and all 
were ethnic Iraqis sent to Jordan merely days 
earlier on the orders of Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi. Zarqawi, formerly a Jordanian 
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national, had become the self-styled leader of 
al-Qa’ida in Iraq. The attack, it seems, was 
meant to punish Jordan for its closeness to the 
United States, among other grievances against 
the Hashemites.23 
Jordanian intelligence services had claimed 
to have previously foiled no less than 150 
other plots to public safety and security from 
militant Islamists affiliated with al-Qa’ida. Yet 
all earlier plots had involved Jordanian 
nationals, while the November 2005 bombings 
were carried out by Iraqi suicide bombers. 
These militants, unfortunately, managed to 
slip through the network of security and 
intelligence to carry out their attacks. Al-
Qa’ida militants had, however, earlier struck 
on a more limited scale, including firing 
Katyusha rockets in Jordan’s port city of 
Aqaba, killing one Jordanian soldier.24 
The scale and barbarity of the Amman 
bombings, each of which targeted a wedding 
party taking place in a major (Western) hotel 
chain in central Amman, seemed to transform 
Jordanian public opinion regarding Islamist 
militancy and terrorism. In a poll conducted 
by the University of Jordan’s Center for 
Strategic Studies, responses to the same 
questions varied greatly between 2004 and 
December 2005--one month after the attacks. 
In the 2004 survey, 68 percent of Jordanians 
polled viewed al-Qa’ida as a “legitimate 
resistance organization.” In 2005, that number 
had declined to 20 percent. Similarly, in 2004, 
only 10.6 percent labeled al-Qa’ida as a 
terrorist organization, while in 2005 that 
number had increased to 48.9 percent. When 
the pollsters added a distinction, and asked 
specifically about the Zarqawi-led 
organization within al-Qa’ida, 72.2 percent of 
Jordanians saw it as a terrorist organization 
rather than a legitimate resistance 
organization.25 
Despite the hostility of most Jordanians, 
including Islamists, to the terrorist attacks, the 
Islamist movement in parliament nonetheless 
soon found itself squaring off with the 
government following a major cabinet 
reshuffle. The new government made clear 
that the monarchy had shifted entirely to 
security-mode. King Abdallah dismissed the 
more moderate Prime Minister Adnan Badran, 
and replaced him with Ma’ruf Bakhit, Jordan’s 
former ambassador to Israel and very much a 
security hawk. Conservative royalists retained 
the speakership posts in both the lower house 
of parliament (under Abd al-Hadi al-Majali) as 
well as the upper house or senate (under 
former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa’i). Neither 
man was known for his sympathies for 
Islamists, or for Palestinians for that matter. 
Aware that security concerns had provided 
the pretext for a host of earlier deliberalization 
moves over the years, Islamist members of 
parliament urged the regime not to use the 
tragedy of the bombings as an excuse to issue 
new martial laws. The government, for its 
part, declared that counterterrorism would be a 
key policy focus and it called for “preemptive 
war” specifically on militant forms of 
Islamism. Although Muslim Brotherhood and 
IAF were not in any way militant, they 
nonetheless feared that new security measures 
might be used against them. In January 2006, 
seemingly on cue, the government issued 
charges against one of the IAF’s leaders, Jamil 
Abu Bakr, for “harming the dignity of the 
state.” The charges stemmed from articles on 
the IAF website that criticized the government 
tendency to appoint officials due mainly to 
connections (wasta) rather than expertise or 
parliamentary consultations. The charges were 
dropped the following month, but the sense of 
harassment remained. The regime meanwhile 
moved still further in its efforts to rein in more 
militant Islamism, including issuing a new law 
restricting preaching in mosques and issuing 
fatwas only to government-approved ulama. 
Finally, perhaps the most ominous sign was 
the new and decidedly elastic anti-terrorism 
law that seemed to greatly expand the roles, 
powers, and influence of the intelligence and 
police services in daily life.26 
 
The Hamas Factor in Jordanian Politics? 
 
With the sweeping victory of Hamas in 
Palestinian legislative elections in January 
2006, a “Hamas factor” appeared to have 
reinvigorated Jordan’s already well-organized 
and well-established Islamist movement. With 
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its emphasis on anti-corruption in its political 
campaign, as well as its maintenance of 
charities, clinics, and schools, Hamas was in 
many ways adopting the electoral strategies 
and tactics of Jordan’s IAF and Muslim 
Brotherhood. Yet unlike Hamas, the IAF and 
Muslim Brotherhood do not have a militant 
wing, and instead focus on civilian party and 
interest group organization and remain very 
much a part of the pro-democratization 
movement in the kingdom. Hamas 
representatives were expelled from Jordan in 
1999, when the kingdom severed ties and 
closed their offices. 
Now, however, with the Hamas victory in 
the 2006 Palestinian elections, the IAF called 
on the Jordanian government to restore ties 
and recognize their achievement. Jordan’s 
Islamists were also inspired by the relative 
success of Muslim Brotherhood candidates 
(running as independents) in Egyptian 
parliamentary elections as well as the rise of 
Islamist activists to power in neighboring Iraq. 
Jordanian Islamists, like their counterparts 
elsewhere, campaigned on platforms of clean 
government and inclusion, and their credibility 
in this area benefited from their already-
established reputation for civic mindedness, 
based on the extensive Muslim Brotherhood 
network of charitable organizations.27 
 In the midst of this Islamist euphoria 
over the inspiring electoral successes of 
others, however, the IAF and Muslim 
Brotherhood did nothing to endear themselves 
to an already suspicious Hashemite regime, 
when Islamist activists chose to attend the 
Arab political parties conference held in 
Damascus in March 2006. Syrian President 
Bashar al-Asad hosted the conference on 
behalf of Syria’s Ba’thist regime. Thus 
Jordanian Islamists attended an event that 
banned Islamists from Syria itself. The point 
was not lost on Syria’s exiled Muslim 
Brotherhood, which lambasted the IAF for its 
lack of solidarity and questionable judgment. 
The IAF meanwhile found itself also 
attacked by the Jordanian government, when 
President Asad mockingly referred to the 
Hashemite regime’s “Jordan First” policy. 
Asad coupled “Jordan First” with Lebanon’s 
recently unveiled “Lebanon First” agenda, 
suggesting that such narrow visions meant that 
surely the United States or Israel lurked as a 
close second. While the Jordanian press 
castigated the Syrian regime for arrogance and 
a long list of other complaints, the Hashemite 
regime remained angered that the Jordanians 
present at the speech had either failed to refute 
Asad’s comments, or worse, had actually 
applauded.28 
 For many Islamists, the Hamas victory 
in the 2006 Palestinian elections was inspiring, 
but it was also a reminder of their comparative 
limitations. Hamas’ electoral win translated 
immediately into a new Hamas-led 
government and cabinet. Within Jordan, in 
contrast, almost two decades of Islamist 
electoral strategies had indeed translated to 
some success, but to no chance whatsoever to 
form an IAF government in Jordan. After the 
Hamas victory, however, a new boldness 
entered the rhetoric of some IAF leaders, who 
now announced their new political program. 
Some aspects remain cornerstones of earlier 
programs: fully implementing Shari’a law, 
abandoning the Wadi Araba treaty, ending 
normalization with Israel.29 Yet others 
included demands to stop attempting to 
“downsize” the Islamist movement through 
electoral laws designed to minimize their 
representation. Azzam al-Hunaydi, the leader 
of the IAF bloc within parliament, minced no 
words when he stated flatly that “that which 
faces the Islamic movement--in terms of 
attempts at marginalization and exclusion, 
tailoring of laws and the policy of ceilings--
will not last indefinitely.” He may have caught 
the attention of Jordan’s security-focused 
regime when he added even more starkly that 
“the time of downsizing, marginalization, 
showing scorn for people and being captive to 
foreigners will end soon.”30 
In the view of Hunaydi and many other 
Islamist activists, Jordan remained committed 
to the wrong paths in both domestic and 
foreign policy. The IAF therefore presented 
itself as an alternative approach, and one that 
was ready to govern. The “Hamas effect,” in 
short, had provided the Jordanian Islamist 
movement with a renewed optimism.31 IAF 
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deputies charged that in freer and fairer 
elections, they might win 40 to 50 percent of 
the vote. With Islamists rising to prominence 
and power through nearby elections--
Hizballah in Lebanon, various Islamist Shi’a 
parties in Iraq, and Hamas in the Palestinian 
territories--Jordanian Islamists argued that 
they might now be poised to win an outright 
majority in parliament. Given Jordan’s heavily 
gerrymandered electoral districts, which favor 
rural over urban districts (and hence under-
represent predominantly Palestinian and 
Islamist areas of the kingdom), the IAF 
optimism may be unfounded. Even aside from 
gerrymandered districts, the party has never 
received close to half the overall votes. Yet 
under a new and more even-handed electoral 
law, they would nonetheless be likely to do 
fairly well. Indeed, IAF and Muslim 
Brotherhood officials made very clear their 
overall view of the current system, when they 
repeatedly called on the regime to issue a new 
“democratic elections law” (emphasis 
added).32 
In addition to concerns about the electoral 
system, Jordanian Islamists also insisted that 
governments should then be drawn from 
parliament in a truer model of a parliamentary 
system, rather than royally-appointed pending 
only the formality of parliamentary approval. 
IAF deputies remained certain that their 
“street” support greatly exceeded their actual 
parliamentary power. In the wrangling within 
Jordanian politics over the next and “final” 
law on parties and elections, the IAF insisted 
that hinted bans on religiously-based parties 
remain off the table, while a more truly 
democratic election law remains very much an 
IAF interest, so that the alleged Islamist street 
majority could one day become a governing 
coalition. 
This issue of linking elections to actual 
governance was a key sticking point in the 
struggle between the government and its 
opposition, when they bargained over the 
ground rules for the next rounds of 
parliamentary elections. Yet in effect, the 
government and its opponents were also 
debating the future nature of the Jordanian 
state itself. 
 
Islamists and the 2007 Jordanian Elections 
 
The November 2007 national parliamentary 
elections followed an earlier round of 
municipal elections, held throughout the 
kingdom in July 2007. If that earlier set of 
elections was viewed as a harbinger of things 
to come, its conclusion did not encourage the 
Islamists. Amidst widespread charges of vote-
rigging, the IAF announced its withdrawal 
from the process, but only on election day 
itself. The government quickly argued that the 
Islamists were merely attempting to save face 
in the midst of a resounding electoral defeat, 
while the Islamist movement, in contrast, 
insisted that the regime was engaged in an 
elaborate process of vote-rigging. Both sides 
may have had a point. At issue was the 
practice of busing soldiers to polling places, 
who would then vote in very large numbers, 
presumably tipping the scales to pro-
government candidates even in Islamist 
strongholds like Irbid and Zarqa. The Islamists 
therefore felt that they were being 
systematically under-represented, and that this 
was part of a broader process to sideline them 
in Jordanian politics and society. Indeed, the 
year before, in 2006, the regime had even 
dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood’s main 
means of distributing its social welfare 
programs and funds: the Islamic Center 
Charity.33 
It was therefore in an atmosphere of 
increasing wariness, and even mutual hostility 
between the state and the Islamist movement, 
that the national election campaign began. 
This tense context only exacerbated divisions 
within the Islamist movement itself, 
particularly between hawks and doves, 
regarding tactics and strategy, if not policy. 
The dovish and moderate wing of the 
movement, which had for so long maintained 
a level of understanding with the Hashemite 
state, even negotiated with the government in 
an attempt to allay the regime’s fears of the 
hawks. Indeed, Jordan’s intelligence services 
seemed to view the hawkish wing, led by IAF 
Secretary General Zaki Bani-Irshayd, as 
increasingly a de facto Jordanian Hamas-style 
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movement operating within the broader 
Islamist framework.34 
The moderate wing agreed to field a mere 
22 candidates (down from the usual 30 or so) 
in the national elections and even ensured that 
most of these would be from the dovish wings 
of the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Having 
secured 17 seats in the previous parliament, 
the Islamist movement expected to retain its 
earlier strength at minimum. Yet when the 
votes were counted, Islamist representation 
(out of a parliament of 110) had plummeted to 
only six seats. More surprisingly, no Islamist 
candidates were elected in key political bases 
such as Irbid and Zarqa.35 Once again, the 
recriminations flowed swiftly. 
The IAF and Muslim Brotherhood leaders 
each accused the government of fraud and 
vote-rigging. Specifically, they argued that 
vote-buying schemes were widespread, with 
the government allegedly ignoring widespread 
irregularities.36 The recriminations did not 
stop there, however, but resurfaced within the 
Islamist movement itself. Hawks such as Bani-
Irshayd, who had been so skeptical of the 
process in the first place, accused moderates 
of losing the elections for the Islamist 
movement. The attempt of the moderates to 
work with the regime appeared to have back-
fired. In his analysis of state survival strategies 
in Jordan, Asher Susser has argued that the 
2007 election outcome was the result, in 
effect, of the more hawkish Islamist elements 
greatly overplaying their hand, combined with 
a pronounced sharp reaction of a state that was 
in a defensive and even “punitive” mood. 
“The attempt by the doves in the movement to 
come to an understanding with the 
government at the last minute was essentially 
rebuffed,” Susser argues, “The hawks had 
crossed a line, and the Islamists as a whole 
were going to be taught a lesson.”37 
For both sides the immediate regional 
context was critical. Islamist successes in 
elections in Gaza, the West Bank, Egypt, 
Lebanon, and even Turkey seemed to prompt 
the Jordanian IAF to push for far more than 
the Jordanian Islamist movement had 
heretofore achieved, or been allowed to 
achieve. While the Hashemite regime, in 
contrast, felt hard-pressed to contain what they 
viewed as a Hamas-like shift within Jordanian 
Islamism. Jordanian analyst Hasan Barari, 
while acknowledging the probability of state 
electioneering, has also argued that the major 
factor may have been a shift in Jordanian 
public opinion itself, especially in the wake of 
the 2005 Amman bombings.38 Despite the 
moderation and reformism of most of Jordan’s 
Islamist movement, there may have been some 
level of public backlash and impatience with 
Islamists in general. 
The main victims of the elections, however, 
may have been--not simply Islamists--but 
moderate Islamists. The government’s strategy 
appeared to be shifting beyond containment of 
Islamism in the kingdom, and towards a more 
active and even aggressive strategy of 
disrupting the movement, and deepening intra-
Islamist divisions. The question, of course, is 
whether this electoral disaster for the Islamist 
movement leads it, ultimately, to itself pursue 
its traditional loyal opposition strategy, or shift 
to a more radical and more confrontational 




For more than 60 years, the Hashemite 
monarchy and its mainstream Islamist 
movement have maintained a cooperative 
relationship. In recent years, however, a 
pattern of deliberalization threatened to erode 
that long pattern of Islamist loyal opposition to 
the monarchy and the state. The monarchy 
saw these measures as necessary, given the 
extreme and even violent circumstances in the 
region. Jordan remained wedged between 
violence in neighboring states: that is, between 
a Palestinian uprising and Israeli military 
responses, to the west, while to the east, Iraq 
was mired in war, occupation, insurgency, and 
civil strife. 
After the 2005 al-Qa’ida bombings in the 
capital itself, the regime’s already-established 
security emphases simply became that much 
stronger. Yet the danger remained that the 
regime’s security concerns were effectively 
undermining Jordan’s once-heralded process 
of political liberalization and democratization. 
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The regime’s tolerance for Islamist dissent, for 
example, was limited indeed. When several 
IAF members of parliament paid a condolence 
call to the family of the late Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi (killed in Iraq in 2006), they were 
soon arrested and tried with crimes against the 
state. The arrested MP’s included Ali Abu 
Sukkar, Ja’far Hurani, and Muhammad Abu 
Faris. Abu Faris angered the regime still 
further (and indeed infuriated Jordanian public 
opinion as well) when, in an interview with 
the satellite television station al-Arabiyya, he 
stated that Zarqawi was a martyr, but that the 
victims of the Amman bombings were not.39 
The three deputies were convicted of inciting 
terrorism, but in a very familiar pattern of 
reining in dissent in Hashemite Jordan, they 
were later pardoned and released. 
Many Islamists read this episode as merely 
a small part of an overall campaign against 
them. Moreover, while Abu Faris is indeed 
more radical than most Islamists active in 
Jordanian public life, the regime’s general 
pattern of actions seemed to be directed not 
simply toward individuals, but rather against 
the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood more 
broadly. While the regime would reject this 
interpretation, many in Jordan’s mainstream 
Islamist movement would not. The Islamist 
movement itself, in the meantime, remained 
divided and indeed strained by the fallout and 
recriminations from the disastrous 2007 
parliamentary elections. 
Even as the hawks attempted to sideline 
moderates, calling for their resignations and 
blaming them for the loss, the moderate 
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood 
managed to respond firmly. In April 2008, the 
internal party court within the Brotherhood 
officially suspended radicals Zaki Bani-
Irshayd and Muhammad Abu Faris for one 
year from membership in the powerful Shura 
council that runs the organization. 40 Yet Bani-
Irshayd retained his position as secretary 
general of the IAF, while the hardline 
Hammam al-Sa’id was elected to be the new 
general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Just 
as importantly, however, the moderates 
reaffirmed their position by securing half of 
the seats on the Brotherhood’s ruling Shura 
council and by electing moderate leader Abd 
al-Latif al-Arabiyyat as head of the council 
itself. The Shura council, therefore, continues 
to reflect the divisions within the Islamist 
movement itself The IAF, for its part, had to 
scramble to make the deadline to comply with 
a new political parties law in the kingdom. 
While Jordanian Islamists objected to the 
newer and more restrictive approach to 
political parties, the IAF did manage in April 
2008 to renew its license and hence retain its 
legal status in Jordan. As the discussion above 
makes clear, however, the debates over tactics, 
strategy, and the role of Islamism in Jordanian 
politics nonetheless continued, both within the 
Islamist movement and within the Hashemite 
regime itself. 
Jordanian government officials often argue 
that any restrictive measures are actually quite 
moderate (when compared to most other states 
in the Middle East) and that they are simply 
prudent given the extreme circumstances in 
the region.41 In contrast, many in the Islamist 
movement feel that the longstanding 
cooperation between reformist Islamism and 
the monarchy may be in decline. These vastly 
different interpretations are a key issue for the 
future of Jordanian politics, as they will in turn 
affect the policies and tactics of both 
government and opposition in Jordan. There 
is, in short, a danger here that the regime’s 
various deliberalization moves in recent years 
(all made in the name of national security) 
may ultimately serve to alienate the moderates 
who make up the overwhelming majority of 
Jordan’s Islamist activists, unwittingly 
empowering the heretofore smaller but more 
militant alternatives. 
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